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I
IMPERIAL AMENDMENT

The British North America Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867)
differed from the constitutions of other federal countries including the United
States and Australia in that it contained no general provision for its own
amendment.' The reason for this omission was that the framers were content
for amendments to be made in the same way as the BNA Act itself-by the
imperial Parliament. Until 1982, that was Canada's amending procedure:
amendments to the BNA Act had to be enacted by the United Kingdom
(imperial) Parliament. Even in 1931, when the Statute of Westminster
conferred upon Canada and the other dominions the power to repeal or
amend imperial statutes applying to them, the BNA Act and its amendments
were excluded from the new power at Canada's insistence. This was done so
that the BNA Act should not be subject to easy amendment by ordinary
legislation of either the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature. The
idea was, and still is, that a constitution should be more difficult to amend
than, for example, an income tax act.
After the Statute of Westminster, while other imperial statutes had lost
their protected status, the BNA Act could still be amended only by the U.K.
Parliament. This did not mean, however, that Canadians had no control over
the amending process. At the imperial conference of 1930 (the same
conference that recommended the enactment of the Statute of Westminster),
the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and all the dominions agreed that
the British Parliament would not enact any statute applying to a dominion
except at the request and with the consent of that dominion. This agreement,
which reflected already long-standing practice, created a binding, although
not formally enacted, constitutional convention.
The convention did not specify which governmental bodies in Canada
were to request, and which were to consent to, proposed amendments to the
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1. There were some limited domestic powers of amendment, of which the most important were
contained in sections 91(1) (power in the federal Parliament to amend a narrowly defined
"Constitution of Canada") and 92(1) (power in each provincial Legislature to amend the
"constitution of the province"). These provisions were both repealed by the Constitution Act, 1982,
but Part V of the Constitution Act contains -counterpart provisions (sections 44 and 45, discussed
below at part III).
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BNA Act. However, long before 1930, the practice had developed of
requesting amendments by a "joint address" of the Canadian House of
Commons and the Canadian Senate. The joint address consisted of a
resolution requesting the government of the United Kingdom to lay before its
Parliament a bill proposing the amendment; the text of the bill was always
included in the resolution. After the resolution was passed by Canada's two
houses of Parliament, it was sent to the British government for its
introduction in the U.K. Parliament and eventual enactment. This procedure
was established in 1895, and has been employed since then for every
amendment to the BNA Act.
What was the role of the provinces in the amending process that has just
been described? Before the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
PatriationReference, 2 the position was unclear. The federal government had
not made a consistent practice of obtaining the consent of the provinces
before requesting an amendment, although unanimous provincial consent
3
had been obtained for all amendments directly affecting provincial powers.
When Prime Minister Trudeau proposed the amendments which ultimately
(and after substantial change) became the Canada Act 1982 and the
Constitution Act, 1982, he asserted that if provincial consent could not be
obtained, the federal government would proceed unilaterally to request the
enactment of the amendments by the U.K. Parliament. The proposed
amendments, including a Charter of Rights and an amending formula,
substantially and directly affected the powers of the provinces. Three
provinces directed references to their Courts of Appeal asking (1) whether
there was a requirement of law that provincial consents be obtained and (2)
whether there was a requirement of convention that provincial consents be
obtained. On appeal from a variety of answers in the Courts of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Canada in the PatriationReference 4 held that the consent of
the provinces to the proposed amendments was not required "as a matter of
law," but that a "substantial degree" of provincial consent was required "as a
matter of convention." After this decision, the Prime Minister and nine of the
ten provincial premiers 5 agreed on a revised version of the amendments. This
2. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753.
3. Twenty-two constitutional amendments were adopted between 1867 and 1965. See Re
Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54, 60-62, and Re Resolution to Amend
the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 826-30, 859-62, 888-91 (reproducing a list of 22 constitutional
amendments appearing in a White Paper titled The Amendment of the Constitution of Canadaprepared by
Guy Favreau for the federal government). Of the 22 amendments, only five-in 1931, 1940, 1951,
1960, and 1964-were preceded by the unanimous consent of the provinces. However, three of
these five amendments-in 1940, 1951 and 1964-altered the distribution of legislative powers
between the two levels of government. Moreover, the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which increased
powers at both levels of government, was included among the five amendments obtaining unanimous
provincial consent even though it was not literally an amendment to the BNA Act. Of the other 17
amendments, none was preceded by unanimous provincial consent, and most were not preceded by
provincial consultation.
4. Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [ 1981] 1 SCR 753. This decision is discussed more fully
in the Canadian Bar Review. See Peter W. Hogg, Comment, 60 Can Bar Rev 307 (1982).
5. The Premier of Quebec was the sole dissenter. This raised the question whether the
conventional rule laid down in PatriationReference of a "substantial degree" of provincial consent had
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version was passed as a joint address by both houses of the federal
Parliament, was sent to London, and enacted by the U.K. Parliament as the
Canada Act 1982,6 which included, as Schedule B, the Constitution Act,
7
1982.
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 introduces into the Canadian
Constitution a set of amending procedures which enable the BNA Act (now
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867) and its amendments to be amended
within Canada without recourse to the U.K. Parliament. The role of the U.K.
Parliament in Canada's amendment process is thus eliminated, and the
Canada Act 1982 formally terminates the authority of the U.K. Parliament
over Canada. The roles of the federal and provincial governments in the
amendment process are now defined in precise statutory language. The
vague and unsatisfactory rules laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the PatriationReference have accordingly been supplanted and have no current
relevance. The new procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982
constitute a complete code of legal (as opposed to conventional) rules which
enable all parts of the "Constitution of Canada" to be amended. Those rules
are described below in Part III.
II
THE SEARCH FOR A DOMESTIC AMENDING PROCEDURE

The Constitution Act, 1982 was the culmination of a search for a domestic
amending procedure that began in 1927 when the federal Minister of Justice
placed the issue on the agenda of the dominion-provincial conference of that
year. The Minister was influenced by the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which
recognized Canada as the equal of the United Kingdom. Equality plainly
called for the elimination of the role of the U.K. Parliament in Canada's
amendment process. But that could not be accomplished until a new
domestic amending procedure had been enacted into Canada's Constitution.
Until November 5, 1981, agreement on a domestic procedure had eluded
Canada's political leaders. And even the 1981 agreement, as related above,
did not include Quebec.
Agreement had nearly been reached on two earlier occasions. In 1964, the
Fulton-Favreau formula was agreed to by all provinces except Quebec. In
effect, it was an agreement not to agree, because it required the unanimous
to include Quebec. See note 4 and accompanying text. On a reference of this question by Quebec,
the Quebec Court of Appeal and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada answered no. Re Objection
to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793.
6. Canada Act, 1982, ch 11 (UK).
7. The reason for two acts seems to have been to separate the provisions relating to the British
Parliament in the Canada Act from the provisions relating to Canadian institutions in the
Constitution Act. The Canada Act became effective upon receiving royal assent on March 29, 1982.
As a schedule to the Canada Act, the Constitution Act became law, but under section 58 of the
Constitution Act its date of effectiveness was postponed until "a day to be fixed by proclamation."
Subsequently, a proclamation fixed April 17, 1982, as the effectiveness date. The Canada Gazette, Part
III 33 (Sept 21, 1982).
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consent of the federal Parliament and all provincial legislatures for most
significant amendments. Even so, Quebec did not agree to it, and it was not
proceeded with. Then in 1970, the Prime Minister and all premiers agreed to
the Victoria Charter formula, but the agreement was subject to ratification by
each provincial government, and Quebec decided not to ratify it. For most
amendments, the Victoria Charter formula required the consent of the federal
Parliament and a complex distribution of provinces: (1) any province having
had at any time 25 percent of the population of Canada; (2) at least two of the
Atlantic provinces; and (3) at least two of the western provinces having a
combined population of at least 50 percent of the population of all the
western provinces. Category (1) insured a permanent veto for Quebec (as
well as Ontario). Even so, Quebec did not agree to it, and it was not
proceeded with.
It will be noticed that both the Fulton-Favreau formula and the Victoria
Charter formula gave a veto to Quebec. Moreover, in 1964 and 1971, it was
clear that all participants understood that Quebec had to be a party to
whatever agreement was reached, because the sole dissent of Quebec was
sufficient to abort both of these previous projects. When Prime Minister
Trudeau tabled the constitutional proposals that evolved into the
Constitution Act, 1982, the amending formula that he proposed was
essentially the Victoria Charter formula. Eight provinces now opposed that
formula and proposed an alternative "Vancouver formula." The Vancouver
formula required for most amendments the agreement of the federal
Parliament and two-thirds of the provincial legislatures, representing 50
percent of the population of all the provinces. This formula did not give any
province a veto, and it was formally proposed in a much-publicized, eightprovince accord which repeatedly affirmed the "equality" of the provinces.
Premier Levesque of Quebec was one of the eight signatories to that
document; for the first time, Quebec had formally abandoned its claim to a
special status involving (at the minimum) a veto over constitutional
amendments.
The agreement of November 5, 1981, was achieved when the Prime
Minister and his two provincial allies, the Premiers of Ontario and New
Brunswick, gave up their support for the Victoria Charter formula and
accepted instead a modified Vancouver formula. Seven of the eight provincial
premiers dissenting from the Victoria Charter formula agreed to accept a
modified Charter of Rights. Quebec Premier Levesque did not agree with the
compromise and even found the new amending formula unacceptable, despite
his earlier agreement to the very similar Vancouver formula.
Once again, as in 1964 and 1971, there was an agreement on an amending
formula that included all premiers, except the Premier of Quebec. But this
time the absence of Quebec from the agreement did not stop the process.
The Prime Minister was determined to press on with the proposal despite the
incomplete agreement, and the Supreme Court of Canada had ruled in the
PatriationReference that the consent of Quebec (or any other province) was not
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required by law, and was probably not required by convention either. The
federal-provincial agreement of November 5, 1981, supplemented by four
changes agreed to later, was accordingly embodied in a resolution for a joint
address that passed both houses of the November 1981 federal Parliament in
December 1981,8 and was then transmitted to London. The Canada Act 1982
was enacted by the U.K. Parliament on March 29, 1982. When the
Constitution Act, 1982 came into force on April 17, 1982, Canada had at last
acquired domestic amending procedures for its Constitution. These
procedures are described later in this article.
III
THE CONSTITUTION ACT,

1982's

AMENDING PROCEDURES

Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is headed "Procedure for
Amending Constitution of Canada," provides the following five different
amending procedures:
(1) A general amending procedure in section 38 for categories of
amendments not otherwise expressly provided for and for specific
types of amendments set forth in section 42, requiring the assents of
the federal Parliament and two-thirds of the provinces representing
50 percent of the population. This procedure has been successfully
operated once. 9
(2) A unanimity procedure in section 41 for five defined kinds of
amendments, requiring the assents of the federal Parliament and all
of the provinces. No amendment has been adopted using this
procedure.I°
(3) A some-but-not-all provinces procedure in section 43 for
amendment of provisions not applying to all provinces, requiring the
assents of the federal Parliament and only those provinces affected.
One amendment has been adopted using this procedure. "
(4) The federal Parliament alone in section 44 has power to amend
provisions relating to the federal executive and Houses of
Parliament.
(5) Each provincial Legislature alone in section 45 has power to
amend "the constitution of the province."
8. It is an interesting commentary on "executive federalism" that of the nine premiers who
signed the agreement of November 5, 1981, only one bothered to submit it to a provincial legislature
for approval. It was approved by the Alberta Legislature on November 10, 1981. The Quebec
National Assembly rejected it on December I, 1981.
9. Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983, adding provisions relating to aboriginal
rights to the Constitution Act, 1982. This amendment was adopted by the Parliament and nine
provincial legislatures (all but Quebec).
10. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text for an account of the Meech Lake Accord, an
unsuccessful attempt to amend the Constitution using the unanimity procedure.
11. Constitution Amendment, 1987 (Newfoundland Act), amending the Newfoundland Act with
respect to denominational school rights. This amendment was adopted by the Parliament of Canada
and the Legislature of Newfoundland.
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The more simple amending procedures of the Australian and United
States constitutions provide an interesting contrast to Canada's. For example,
amendments to the Australian Constitution require approval by a simple
majority in both houses of the federal Parliament, followed by a popular
referendum in which the requisite approval must be by a "double majority" of
votes, which involves (1) a national majority and (2) a state majority in a
majority of states (that is, four of the six states). The U.S. Constitution
requires approval by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress,
followed by ratification by the legislatures of three-quarters of the states or,
alternatively, at the discretion of the Congress, by constitutional conventions
2
in three-quarters of the states-a method that has been used only once.'
IV
THE FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE QUEBEC

The Constitution Act, 1982 was a major achievement, curing several
longstanding defects in Canada's Constitution. In addition to adopting
domestic amending procedures (sections 38-49), a Charter of Rights was
adopted (sections 1-34), aboriginal rights were recognized (section 35),
equalization of disparities in the welfare of Canadians was guaranteed (section
36), provincial powers over natural resources were extended (sections 50-51),
and the Constitution of Canada was defined and given supremacy over other
laws (section 52). But the Constitution Act, 1982 signally failed to accomplish
one of the goals of constitutional reform, and that was the better
accommodation of Quebec within the Canadian federation.
The Premier of Quebec had been the sole dissenter to the federalprovincial meeting of November 5, 198 1; the Quebec National Assembly had
passed a resolution condemning the constitutional settlement that had been
agreed upon; and Quebec had even sought relief in the courts, though
without success.' 3 Nor were Quebec's concerns without substance. The new
amending procedures denied a veto to Quebec, something that in the past
had always been recognized in practice. The new Charter of Rights restricted
the powers of the provincial legislatures, and, in particular, limited the
capacity of the Quebec National Assembly to implement French-language
policy.'

4

Thus, the outcome of the constitutional changes of 1982 was a

diminution of Quebec's powers and a profound sense of grievance in the
province.
In assessing the

gravity of Quebec's

alienation resulting from the

constitutional changes of 1982, it is important to recall Quebec's referendum
12. The sole occasion on which approval by state conventions was used to approve an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution was in 1933 for the twenty-first amendment repealing
prohibition. US Const, Amend xxi.
13. See note 5.
14. This concern was shown to be justified by the later decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Quebec (Attorney General) v Quebec Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 SCR 66 (striking down
Quebec's restrictions on admission to English-language schools) and Ford v Quebec (Attornev General),
[19881 2 SCR 712 (striking down Quebec's prohibition of English-language commercial signs).
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on sovereignty-association, which was held by the Parti Quebecois
government in the spring of 1980. The referendum was defeated by a
popular vote of 60 percent to 40 percent. In the referendum campaign, the
federalist forces promised that a vote of "no" to sovereignty-association was
not a vote for the status quo and that the defeat of the referendum would be
followed by constitutional reforms that would better accommodate Quebec's
aspirations within the federal structure. The defeat of the referendum was
immediately followed by a series of federal-provincial conferences in the
summer and early fall of 1980, but the conferences failed to yield agreement
on the specifics of constitutional change. On October 6, 1980, despite the
absence of a federal-provincial agreement, Prime Minister Trudeau
introduced in the House of Commons a resolution calling for the set of
constitutional amendments that, after substantial alteration, became the
Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Act, 1982. These 1982 changes
obviously did not fulfill the promises made during the 1980 referendum
campaign in Quebec.
Quebec was of course legally bound by the Constitution Act, 1982 because
the Act had been adopted into law by the correct constitutional procedures.
However, the government of Quebec thereafter refused to participate in
constitutional changes that involved the new amending procedures.
Furthermore, Quebec "opted out" of the new Charter of Rights to the
maximum extent possible under section 33 by introducing a "notwithstanding
clause" into each of its existing statutes, and into every newly-enacted
statute.' 5 In these ways, the point was made that the Constitution Act, 1982
lacked political legitimacy in the province of Quebec.
In 1984, Prime Minister Trudeau resigned and, after a general election,
the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Mulroney took
office. One of the new government's policies was reconciliation with Quebec.
In 1985, an election was held in Quebec, and the Parti Qu~bcois government
was defeated. Quebec then moved toward reconciliation with the rest of
Canada through the new Liberal government of Premier Bourassa, which took
office after the Parti Quebecois was defeated. The new government
announced five conditions that were required for Quebec's acceptance of the
Constitution Act, 1982: (1) the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; (2)
a greater role in immigration; (3) a provincial role in appointments to the
Supreme Court of Canada; (4) limitations on the federal spending power; and
(5) a veto for Quebec on constitutional amendments.
The Prime Minister and the other provincial premiers agreed to negotiate
on Quebec's five conditions. The outcome of those negotiations was the
Meech Lake Constitutional Accord of 1987, an agreement entered into by all
eleven first ministers on a set of amendments essentially giving effect to
Qeubec's five conditions. This seemed at the time to be an immensely
15. Section 33 enables the Parliament or a provincial legislature to override most of the
provisions of the Charter of Rights by including a provision in a statute declaring that the statute is to
operate notwithstanding a particular provision of the Charter of Rights.
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important development, reconciling the government of Quebec to the
Constitution Act, 1982. However, in order to become law, the Accord had to
be ratified by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the
legislative assembly of every province.' 6 It was ratified by the Senate and
House of Commons,' 7 but only eight of the ten provinces ratified it.18 The
Accord therefore lapsed. A unique opportunity to resolve a serious political
problem was squandered.
The lapse of the Meech Lake Accord caused great disappointment in the
province of Quebec, because it seemed to indicate that the rest of Canada was
unwilling to make any accommodation with Quebec. This has caused an
increase in nationalist sentiment in the province that will make a new
accommodation much harder to achieve. We must find a way of reaching that
accommodation, because another failure would certainly lead to the secession
of Quebec.

16. The unanimity procedure of section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was applicable,
because the Accord included provisions relating to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada
(section 41 (d)) and a change in the amending procedures (section 41 (e)).
17. The Senate actually refused to ratify it, but was overridden by the House of Commons under
section 47 of the Constitution Act.
18. The government of New Brunswick changed in 1987 before ratification, and the Liberal
government of Premier McKenna refused to ratify. The same thing happened in Manitoba in 1988,
and the new Progressive Conservative government of Premier Filmon refused to ratify. The
government of Newfoundland changed in 1989 after ratification, and the new Liberal government of
Premier Wells acted under section 46(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to revoke the previous
ratification. In an attempt to bring the dissenters on board, a companion accord was agreed to by the
First Ministers in Ottawa on June 6, 1990, which proposed some changes to the original Accord.
This was followed by New Brunswick's ratification, but the legislative assemblies of Manitoba and
Newfoundland adjourned without bringing the issue to a vote by June 23, 1990. Section 39(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 caused the process to lapse on that date, which was three years from the date
of the first legislative ratification, which had been by Quebec on June 23, 1987.

